EL NOMBRE MADURO ES BASURA EN EL MUNDO FINANCIERO INTERNACIONAL

El hampón corre pero no tendrá donde esconderse

La reciente demanda por cesación de pagos introducida contra Venezuela en Washington DC por la empresa Gold Reserves (ver mi entrega anterior en este blog)  es una de las más graves pero no la única.  A esta empresa Maduro le debe $750 millones y no le quiere pagar. Solo ante el Banco Mundial se han introducido 39 demandas en contra del régimen de Nicolás Maduro. Hace poco la empresa Owens Illinois ganó una demanda de $455 millones en contra del régimen, el cual se niega igualmente a pagar. Así sucede con otras demandas perdias por el ruinoso régimen. La negativa a pagar las deudas contraídas por la pandilla de salvajes que representa Maduro ha convertido su nombre en una mala palabra, algo así como basura, en el mundo financiero internacional y en las organizaciones multilaterales del planeta.  Se saldrá este salvaje con las suyas negándose a pagar, mientras acaba de decir que seguirá comprando tnques, aviones y misiles rusos?

Que sucede cuando el régimen maula venezolana se niega a pagar sus deudas internacionales? El Inter American Dialogue, basado en Washington DC,  http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/LAA/Daily/2015/LAA150331.pdf , recoge la opinión de varios expertos sobre esta pregunta, las cuales transcribo de seguidas, ver: :

El experto Ryan Mellske, associate at Three Crowns LLP in Washington dice : "Grounds for annulment are limited (only 13 of 189 ICSID awards have been annulled), and Venezuela might not refuse to pay the award simply because it must honor ICSID rulings to avoid default on certain sovereign bonds. Still, when countries refuse to pay an award, an investor can attempt to recover against assets held by the country in most jurisdictions worldwide. An ICSID award is binding in all member states. Awards rendered under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law are usually enforced by the national courts of all members to the New York Convention. An investor can also pressure the country through, for example, contract claims in commercial arbitration against the nation's state-owned entity, claims in national courts against third parties who seek to benefit from the country's wrongful acts and participation by other industry stakeholders in negotiations. The investor may also call on its home state to issue sanctions to induce compliance. These include denying trade benefits, voting against extending loans from multilateral lending institutions and reducing appropriations for foreign assistance. As a last resort, the investor's home country could bring a claim against the non-paying state before the International Court of Justice. Failure to comply with a judgment of the ICJ could be referred to the U.N. Security Council….

Por su parte Nigel Blackaby, co-head of international arbitration at Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer in Washington: "ICSID was founded by the 1965 ICSID Convention which requires signatory states automatically to comply with awards. Article 53 states unequivocally, 'Each [state] party shall abide by and comply with the terms of the award.' As a consequence, any country that fails to do so is in breach of its international obligations to all other (roughly 160) signatories to the ICSID Convention. The specific investment treaty will also likely oblige a losing state to comply immediately with an award failing which it will be in breach of its international obligations toward the other party to that treaty. The consequence of these breaches of international law will increase the risk profile (and thus the cost of borrowing and access to borrowing) of the recalcitrant government. It may also cause those countries whose nationals have not received payment of awards to vote negatively in multilateral funding forums such as the IDB and the World Bank. Separately under Article 54 of the ICSID Convention, the courts of the other signatory states have to recognize and enforce that award as if it were a final judgment: 'Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.' So if a government does not comply, the investor can start hunting for and freezing seizable state assets. Ultimately, if a country wishes to participate in the international community, it needs to comply with adverse awards. Even Argentina (which had historically not complied with adverse awards) eventually recognized this fact when in November 2013 it paid five long outstanding awards to British, U.S. and French investors

Y el Sr. Jaime Martínez Estévez, partner at Rodner, Martínez & Asociados in Caracas agrega:  "Venezuela denounced its bilateral investment treaty with the Netherlands in 2008 and the ICSID Convention in 2012. However, both continue to be binding for investments made and arbitrations started prior to their terminations. Venezuelan officials have expressed constitutional and political considerations for the withdrawals, which could be used to justify ignoring the award. However, last year, Rafael Ramírez, then Venezuela's foreign minister, welcomed an ICSID award in the ExxonMobil case as a victory for Venezuela. Procedural actions could delay enforcement. Venezuela questioned the jurisdiction and is likely to request the revision and/or annulment of the decision, as it has done in other cases. Political arguments could be used to delay payment negotiations, as well. Venezuela's pressing economic situation, particularly its level of international reserves, would invite delaying tactics. In the current political and economic circumstances, an award refusal could occur regardless of the forum. ICSID enforcement conditions are better than those under the New York Convention. Annulment claims have to be settled in accordance with Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, and there is no appeal or recourse (other than per the convention) for enforcement in any of the 159 signatory countries. A refusal will have a negative effect on the prospects and cost of new investments. Venezuela would be induced to payment negotiations to avoid seizure of assets abroad and the increased cost of a forced payment. Plaintiffs will seek freezing assets in advance, based on Article 47 of the convention."

mientras tanto, sigue comprando chatarra bélica de Putin 

Es decir, todos los expertos coinciden en que la negativa a pagar convertiría al régimen de Maduro en un paria, en forajido, como ya está definido politicamente y abriría las puertas de inmediato a sanciones económicas por parte de los países cuyas empresas se encuentran afectadas, en especial los Estados Unidos. 

Cada dia que pasa el régimen de Maduro se aisla más de la comunidad internacional y se limita a descansar en Cuba, China y en un cada vez más acosado Vladimir Putin, quien seguirá apoyando a Maduro mientras le siga comprando su bisutería bélica. El pandillero es uno de sus mejores clientes.