En enero el régimen chavista cocinó algo llamado el Fondo Bicentenario, con un aporte de mil millones de dólares según la Radio nacional de Venezuela o de 697 millones de dólares según el analista Juan Francisco Rojas Penso (www.analitica.com, Febrero 9, 2010). El fondo ha sido lanzado, como ya es costumbre del régimen, con bombos y platillos. Se alega que podrá financiar 8000 industrias, ya tiene 4545 proyectos, según Rojas Penso, nos garantizará la soberanía alimenticia y estimulará nuestras exportaciones, según los ministros que ya fueron botados por Chávez. La credulidad o ingenuidad de algunos analistas como Rojas Penso los hace decir, entusiasmados: “Contrario a lo que sucedía en el pasado cuando en este tipo de certamen la participación se limitaba a agentes gubernamentales y empresariales, en esta oportunidad fue mas que notoria la incorporación de diversos grupos sociales a través de los Consejos Comunales u otra forma de organización, lo cual habla del proceso de democratización que vive el país desde hace once años”. Sin embargo, los primeros informes de asistentes a la reunión hablan de caos organizativo, el cual ha sido característica de todo lo que hace el régimen. Otros informes hablan de 326 proyectos aprobados, cifra bastante diferente a los 4545 proyectos mencionados por el ingenuo Rojas Penso.
El análisis del bueno de Rojas Penso habla de la necesidad de articular los proyectos de este fondo con los planes nacionales de desarrollo y uno se pregunta: cuales planes? El plan socialista que menciona el analista es un arroz con mango ideológico que solo es entendible, y no es seguro, por Jorge Giordani. La reducción de la heterogeneidad de la economía de la cual habla Rojas Penso como una de las estrategias del plan no hace sentido en un país que se distingue precisamente por su carácter monoproductor. Añade Rojas Penso que será indispensable que el estado preste asistencia técnica a los proyectos, aunque él debería saber que en este campo el régimen se ha mostrado particularmente ineficiente e inepto.
Este artículo que parecería hecho por encargo olvida lo que caratcteriza al régimen, su total falta de coordinación y de recursos humanos capacitados. Por ejemplo, como puede caminar un plan de producción de pequeñas y medianas empresas si en el país no hay agua, no hay luz, hay un feroz y corrupto control de cambios y el régimen actúa de manera totalmente abusiva contra los derechos de los empresarios? En que país vive el amigo Rojas Penso? En un país como la Venezuela de Chávez, que está colocado en el foso en lo que se refiere a libertades económicas (peor que Cuba, aunque esto parezca imposible), no puede haber posibilidad alguna de desarrollar un significativo sector de pequeña y mediana industria.
El fondo ha sido definido por algunos comentaristas de izquierda como una manera de quitarle dinero al pueblo, a través de la devaluación, para dárselo a los empresarios. Por su parte, algunos comentaristas de derecha dicen que el fondo será otra manera más de robar. Hay que recordar el Plan Bolivar 2000 y el Fondo Único Social, planes que terminaron siendo verdaderos pozos sépticos utilizados por el chavismo para favorecer la boliburguesía.
La ingenuidad de Rojas Penso, a quien damos el beneficio de la buena intención, le hace el juego al bandidaje chavista que ha arruinado al país.
LAS ARMAS DE CORONEL
martes, 16 de febrero de 2010
lunes, 15 de febrero de 2010
Elías Jaua: el estúpido vicepresidente
Puede ser "esto" un vicepresidente de Venezuela? Ni de Zimbabue, pués.Ante una oferta de suministro de energía eléctrica de Colombia para Venezuela, agobiada por una crisis del sector eléctrico como nunca se había experimentado antes, el quedado Elías Jaua, nada menos que vicepresidente de la república, respondió: “No la necesitamos, Venezuela trabaja para fortalecer su propio sistema eléctrico”. Y “garantizó” que para Mayo todo estaría normal en nuestro país en materia de electricidad.
Este Sr. Jaua es un estúpido de marca mayor. Cuando el país está en crisis, lo primero que hay que hacer es aceptar todas las ofertas de ayuda posibles, sobretodo de países vecinos. Así como se trajeron al carnicero Cubano, Ramiro Valdés, de asesor en materia de electricidad, era mucho más lógico haber aceptado la oferta de Colombia, que si tiene la electricidad para suplirla a nuestro país.
Pero no. La lógica no juega ningún papel en este drama. El estúpido Elías Jaua rechaza la oferta Colombiana porque Chávez le ordena hacerlo. Aceptarla representaría una nueva derrota política para el “ponchao”. No se trata de hacer lo que se debe hacer para el bien del país sino que se trata de evitar una humillación más para el “ponchao”.
Esto demuestra que el régimen agoniza. Una vicepresidencia en manos de un estúpido ignorante como Elías Jaua, los ministerios en manos de gentuza que entra y sale con una celeridad pasmosa, la corrupción desaforada de PDVSA y de los estratos jerárquicos altos del ejército, todo esto apunta a un régimen en desintegración. Sálvese quien pueda, chilla agudamente, horrorizado, Jesse Chacón.
Venezuela está en manos de corruptos, estúpidos e ineptos. Es necesario sacarlos a patadas del poder. Ya tienen medio cuerpo afuera.
Orinoco Flow
Five are left.
Since 1965 I have been conversant with the heavy oils of the Orinoco area. I started to get familiar with the area through the work of Galavis and Velarde that was published in 1967 in the VII World Petroleum Congress, in Mexico City, under my co- supervision as Exploration Manager of the Corporacion Venezolana del Petroleo. This work defined well what the so-called “Faja” was all about, an extensive area north of the Orinoco river where very heavy oil could be found at shallow depths. This “belt” was simply the southern border of the Eastern Venezuela Geological Basin. Geologists familiar with the area know that the oil gets lighter and lighter to the north, towards the center of the basin, where API oil gravities are 40 degrees or more.
As a senior production geologist for Phillips Petroleum in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, I made a very detailed study of Morichal, one of the oilfields in the “Faja” and became very familiar with the fluvial and deltaic nature of the producing sands, their horizontal and vertical development, the physical characteristics of the oils and so on. In the 1960’s we already knew that these heavy oils were rich in nickel, vanadium and sulfur and that producing and selling the stuff was going to be a major headache. At a time, in fact, we in Shell thought of marketing similar oil, Boscan. as an aphrodisiac. This idea did not prosper.
One of the problems in developing the area was the low recovery factor. In heavy oils the recovery factor tends to be much lower than for light oils. The reason is simple. Heavy oils do not flow easily. In addition, the Orinoco heavy oils lacked an efficient mechanism of production in the reservoirs such as a strong water drive, they had low associated gas and did not seem to show compaction, although this last mechanism is only apparent after a considerable production history has been established. We always thought of 8-10 percent of the oil in place as the most we could recover from these multiple and somewhat erratic sands, unless some real technological breakthroughs became available.
In those years the “Faja” became a political sacred cow. The “technocrats” wanted to develop it, the moderate politicians of COPEI and AD wanted to keep it as “a research project” (whatever that meant), Perez Alfonzo said that it should be kept intact for future generations and the extreme left accused the CIA of trying to put their dirty hands on the “belt”. After the “nationalization” took place in 1976 the technical staff of the Ministry of Energy wanted to manage the development while PDVSA argued that they should be the ones doing it. As a result it was only in the 1990’s when portions of the “Faja” were contracted to multinational oil companies for development, as part of the so-called “apertura” (opening) of the oil industry to foreign, private participation. This move was extremely positive for the nation. After a significant investment was made an important production was established and, more important, significant upgrading of the oil was achieved. The oil companies started to get returns on their investment and this return increased as prices of oil increased.
When Chavez arrived in power and the greedy Ramirez gang took over management of PDVSA they decided to alter unilaterally the nature of the contracts. First they increased the royalties to be paid, later the nature of the contracts themselves. What could have been done in a civilized, negotiated manner was done through ukase-like ultimatums. Ramirez kept telling the companies, arrogantly, that it would be: “my way or the highway”, confusing vulgarity with patriotism. Paradoxically, the main change they imposed on the contractors was to force them to become part owners. And they called this Nationalization! Up to that moment the foreign companies had operated on behalf of PDVSA and delivered the oil to them. The changes obliged the foreign companies to become shareholders and to become owners of part of the oil produced and upgraded.
However, PDVSA did not compensate the companies for their investments in an opportune manner. As a result, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips denounced the contracts and asked for arbitration. Other companies tried to negotiate with PDVSA without much success. I don’t know the current status of these negotiations.
As this was going on, PDVSA decided to offer new “Faja” areas for development. For two or more years they conducted a very confusing bidding process in an area called Carabobo, while negotiating directly with other companies for contracts in another portion of the “Faja” called Junin. The foreign companies were expected to own no more than 40 percent of the joint venture but were expected to supply 100 percent of the capital. Since every new module of production and upgrading of 400,000 barrels would require about $ 12-20 billion in investments, PDVSA asked the international companies to supply their portion of the investments, to be repaid later in oil or some other agreed manner.
So far two Carabobo blocks have been awarded to consortia led by Chevron and Repsol. In the other area, Junin, the government has said that ENI, China Petroleum Co. and a Russian group have signed letters of intention to develop three blocks. However, not one single new area has been developed yet, or even started to be developed after the eleven years Chavez has been in power. Everything has been mostly “blah, blah, blah”. One wonders the logistical nightmare of these five Orinoco blocks being developed at the same time. How many drilling rigs? How many kilometers of new pipe? And the metals produced? How will they be disposed of?
It seems unusual that two of the consortia have gone through a bidding process while three other companies or groups have negotiated directly with PDVSA. This is risky for the companies and bad for the nation. Transparency is usually the first casualty of this type of dealings.
Not only these dealings have been going on, but a process of “certification” of reserves has also been conducted, more or less in parallel. Companies from Vietnam, Iran, Cuba, Russia, China and other state-owned companies from ideologically friendly countries have been conducting “reservoir and engineering” studies in the Orinoco area that are supposed to validate reserves in the “Faja”. This process has been a rather clownish affair. These companies have been given all information on the areas and are paid by the Venezuelan regime to “study” the information. In so doing they become acquainted with the geology of the area and are given later the option to obtain a block for development without a bidding process, just as it happened with the Chinese and the Russians.
I have all kinds of reservations about this process. I think is a fraud for the nation. I think it has compromised our national sovereignty. I think it has served to promote high levels of corruption in PDVSA. I think is worthless as a process of certification of reserves since there is no really new significant knowledge available about the “Faja”. Whatever new “reserves” have been certified has been the product of a totally arbitrary change in the assumed recovery factor. Obviously, if the recovery factor is doubled, the “reserves” also magically doubled. This matter of recoverable oil in the “Faja” has become a real ugly mess in which the media, the regime, even the US Geological Survey share the blame. The estimate of the oil in place has not changed much in the last 50 years. What has been changing is the estimate of the amount of oil that can be recovered, from 8 percent to 15, to 20, now to 40 percent according to a campaign of misinformation led by Hugo Chavez. In the event where Chevron and Repsol were notified officially they were the winners, Chavez was quoted as saying (as reported by The Oil and Gas Journal): “A recent US Geological Survey report [states] that the Orinoco belt holds 513 billion bbl of recoverable heavy crude. In its report, USGS established a range of recoverable oil of 380-652 billion bbl and determined a mean estimate of 513 billion bbl”. What the USGS said was not this, of course, but now Chavez uses the report by the Geological Survey to tell the world that Venezuela has more “proven reserves” than Saudi Arabia, therefore, more geopolitical punch.
WHO will be in the “Faja”?
There are five consortia in the area now: Chevron et al, Repsol et al, China Petroleum Company, The Russian/BP consortium and ENI. They have agreed with PDVSA to pay a bonus and to develop a block in the Orinoco area. The general information given out is that each block will develop some 400,000 barrels per day of upgraded oils, with a required investment of some $ 12-20 billion, say an average of $16 billion each. This would mean that PDVSA should invest some $50 billion of their own money in the area during the next five to six years. I think this is bullshit. If PDVSA pretends to pay its partners with oil, this would require about one billion barrels of oil. This represents about 150,000 barrels per day for the next 20 years. The problems are several, including one of legality. No government can legally mortgage national assets beyond their term. The foreign partners would have to re- negotiate terms with the government that comes after Chavez. After Chavez departs, anything can happen.
Many oil Companies have long maintained business dealings with dictators, have kept cozy relationships with corrupt local officers, all for the sake of keeping a good commercial relationship with the country, trying to look the other way since so much money is on the balance. It is difficult to know if the oil companies come out on top due to this accommodating behavior with despots, or if they end up losing in the long term. The problem is that companies, as countries, have their cycles. If the company “A” made a deal with a dictator in the 1980’s and this deal provoked a political backlash against the company in 2005, chances are that the managers of the company in the 1980’s are now playing golf in Bermuda. Shareholders would probably not look beyond composite results and will not know what went on in any particular country, unless there is major scandal.
In Venezuela the political generations of the 20th century were strongly biased against international oil companies because of what they felt were their unholy alliances with Juan Vicente Gomez and, later, with Marcos Perez Jimenez. Similarly, whoever deals with Hugo Chavez today could become deeply resented by the political leadership that replaces Chavez. And Chavez might not be around much longer.
Since 1965 I have been conversant with the heavy oils of the Orinoco area. I started to get familiar with the area through the work of Galavis and Velarde that was published in 1967 in the VII World Petroleum Congress, in Mexico City, under my co- supervision as Exploration Manager of the Corporacion Venezolana del Petroleo. This work defined well what the so-called “Faja” was all about, an extensive area north of the Orinoco river where very heavy oil could be found at shallow depths. This “belt” was simply the southern border of the Eastern Venezuela Geological Basin. Geologists familiar with the area know that the oil gets lighter and lighter to the north, towards the center of the basin, where API oil gravities are 40 degrees or more.
As a senior production geologist for Phillips Petroleum in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, I made a very detailed study of Morichal, one of the oilfields in the “Faja” and became very familiar with the fluvial and deltaic nature of the producing sands, their horizontal and vertical development, the physical characteristics of the oils and so on. In the 1960’s we already knew that these heavy oils were rich in nickel, vanadium and sulfur and that producing and selling the stuff was going to be a major headache. At a time, in fact, we in Shell thought of marketing similar oil, Boscan. as an aphrodisiac. This idea did not prosper.
One of the problems in developing the area was the low recovery factor. In heavy oils the recovery factor tends to be much lower than for light oils. The reason is simple. Heavy oils do not flow easily. In addition, the Orinoco heavy oils lacked an efficient mechanism of production in the reservoirs such as a strong water drive, they had low associated gas and did not seem to show compaction, although this last mechanism is only apparent after a considerable production history has been established. We always thought of 8-10 percent of the oil in place as the most we could recover from these multiple and somewhat erratic sands, unless some real technological breakthroughs became available.
In those years the “Faja” became a political sacred cow. The “technocrats” wanted to develop it, the moderate politicians of COPEI and AD wanted to keep it as “a research project” (whatever that meant), Perez Alfonzo said that it should be kept intact for future generations and the extreme left accused the CIA of trying to put their dirty hands on the “belt”. After the “nationalization” took place in 1976 the technical staff of the Ministry of Energy wanted to manage the development while PDVSA argued that they should be the ones doing it. As a result it was only in the 1990’s when portions of the “Faja” were contracted to multinational oil companies for development, as part of the so-called “apertura” (opening) of the oil industry to foreign, private participation. This move was extremely positive for the nation. After a significant investment was made an important production was established and, more important, significant upgrading of the oil was achieved. The oil companies started to get returns on their investment and this return increased as prices of oil increased.
When Chavez arrived in power and the greedy Ramirez gang took over management of PDVSA they decided to alter unilaterally the nature of the contracts. First they increased the royalties to be paid, later the nature of the contracts themselves. What could have been done in a civilized, negotiated manner was done through ukase-like ultimatums. Ramirez kept telling the companies, arrogantly, that it would be: “my way or the highway”, confusing vulgarity with patriotism. Paradoxically, the main change they imposed on the contractors was to force them to become part owners. And they called this Nationalization! Up to that moment the foreign companies had operated on behalf of PDVSA and delivered the oil to them. The changes obliged the foreign companies to become shareholders and to become owners of part of the oil produced and upgraded.
However, PDVSA did not compensate the companies for their investments in an opportune manner. As a result, Exxon Mobil and ConocoPhillips denounced the contracts and asked for arbitration. Other companies tried to negotiate with PDVSA without much success. I don’t know the current status of these negotiations.
As this was going on, PDVSA decided to offer new “Faja” areas for development. For two or more years they conducted a very confusing bidding process in an area called Carabobo, while negotiating directly with other companies for contracts in another portion of the “Faja” called Junin. The foreign companies were expected to own no more than 40 percent of the joint venture but were expected to supply 100 percent of the capital. Since every new module of production and upgrading of 400,000 barrels would require about $ 12-20 billion in investments, PDVSA asked the international companies to supply their portion of the investments, to be repaid later in oil or some other agreed manner.
So far two Carabobo blocks have been awarded to consortia led by Chevron and Repsol. In the other area, Junin, the government has said that ENI, China Petroleum Co. and a Russian group have signed letters of intention to develop three blocks. However, not one single new area has been developed yet, or even started to be developed after the eleven years Chavez has been in power. Everything has been mostly “blah, blah, blah”. One wonders the logistical nightmare of these five Orinoco blocks being developed at the same time. How many drilling rigs? How many kilometers of new pipe? And the metals produced? How will they be disposed of?
It seems unusual that two of the consortia have gone through a bidding process while three other companies or groups have negotiated directly with PDVSA. This is risky for the companies and bad for the nation. Transparency is usually the first casualty of this type of dealings.
Not only these dealings have been going on, but a process of “certification” of reserves has also been conducted, more or less in parallel. Companies from Vietnam, Iran, Cuba, Russia, China and other state-owned companies from ideologically friendly countries have been conducting “reservoir and engineering” studies in the Orinoco area that are supposed to validate reserves in the “Faja”. This process has been a rather clownish affair. These companies have been given all information on the areas and are paid by the Venezuelan regime to “study” the information. In so doing they become acquainted with the geology of the area and are given later the option to obtain a block for development without a bidding process, just as it happened with the Chinese and the Russians.
I have all kinds of reservations about this process. I think is a fraud for the nation. I think it has compromised our national sovereignty. I think it has served to promote high levels of corruption in PDVSA. I think is worthless as a process of certification of reserves since there is no really new significant knowledge available about the “Faja”. Whatever new “reserves” have been certified has been the product of a totally arbitrary change in the assumed recovery factor. Obviously, if the recovery factor is doubled, the “reserves” also magically doubled. This matter of recoverable oil in the “Faja” has become a real ugly mess in which the media, the regime, even the US Geological Survey share the blame. The estimate of the oil in place has not changed much in the last 50 years. What has been changing is the estimate of the amount of oil that can be recovered, from 8 percent to 15, to 20, now to 40 percent according to a campaign of misinformation led by Hugo Chavez. In the event where Chevron and Repsol were notified officially they were the winners, Chavez was quoted as saying (as reported by The Oil and Gas Journal): “A recent US Geological Survey report [states] that the Orinoco belt holds 513 billion bbl of recoverable heavy crude. In its report, USGS established a range of recoverable oil of 380-652 billion bbl and determined a mean estimate of 513 billion bbl”. What the USGS said was not this, of course, but now Chavez uses the report by the Geological Survey to tell the world that Venezuela has more “proven reserves” than Saudi Arabia, therefore, more geopolitical punch.
WHO will be in the “Faja”?
There are five consortia in the area now: Chevron et al, Repsol et al, China Petroleum Company, The Russian/BP consortium and ENI. They have agreed with PDVSA to pay a bonus and to develop a block in the Orinoco area. The general information given out is that each block will develop some 400,000 barrels per day of upgraded oils, with a required investment of some $ 12-20 billion, say an average of $16 billion each. This would mean that PDVSA should invest some $50 billion of their own money in the area during the next five to six years. I think this is bullshit. If PDVSA pretends to pay its partners with oil, this would require about one billion barrels of oil. This represents about 150,000 barrels per day for the next 20 years. The problems are several, including one of legality. No government can legally mortgage national assets beyond their term. The foreign partners would have to re- negotiate terms with the government that comes after Chavez. After Chavez departs, anything can happen.
Many oil Companies have long maintained business dealings with dictators, have kept cozy relationships with corrupt local officers, all for the sake of keeping a good commercial relationship with the country, trying to look the other way since so much money is on the balance. It is difficult to know if the oil companies come out on top due to this accommodating behavior with despots, or if they end up losing in the long term. The problem is that companies, as countries, have their cycles. If the company “A” made a deal with a dictator in the 1980’s and this deal provoked a political backlash against the company in 2005, chances are that the managers of the company in the 1980’s are now playing golf in Bermuda. Shareholders would probably not look beyond composite results and will not know what went on in any particular country, unless there is major scandal.
In Venezuela the political generations of the 20th century were strongly biased against international oil companies because of what they felt were their unholy alliances with Juan Vicente Gomez and, later, with Marcos Perez Jimenez. Similarly, whoever deals with Hugo Chavez today could become deeply resented by the political leadership that replaces Chavez. And Chavez might not be around much longer.
El comandante... en su soledad
Por fin puedo estar solo. Ya cada día son menos las horas que puedo gozar de privacidad y descanso. Siempre estoy rodeado de caras anhelantes, todos desean algo de mí, o de la gente que dice que me cuida. Pero, realmente me estarán cuidando o serán cosas del tata, para tenerme vigilado?
Me veo en el espejo y me asombro. Hce apenas 15 años lo que veía en el espejo era un muchacho. Ahora veo a alguien fofo e inmenso. Y siempre sudando, yo que no sudaba antes. Estoy llegando al punto que prefiero no verme desnudo. No reconozco esas adiposidades, me da verguenza verme. Y apenas tengo 54 años! Pienso que los pequeños gritos de placer de la modelo que me trajo Nicolás pueden haber sido ensayados. En mi corazón tengo la certeza de que ella hubiese preferido estar con alguien como el que yo fui hace 30 años, alguien de piel suave como Tarek. Ella me dijo que nunca había estado con un hombre como yo! Creo que me estaba vacilando. Odio que me traten de engañar, yo que jamás he engañado a nadie.
Abro el gabinete del baño y saco las pastillas que el médico me ha recetado. Ya son cinco las que debo tomar cada noche, antes de dormir. La azul es para la tensión, la gris para la depre, la amarilla es un complejo vitamínico, la verde para un pequeño temblor en las manos que me ha aparecido hace unos meses y que se intensifica cuando Uribe hace declaraciones. La pastillita blanca es para dormir. A veces es la única que tomo porque me parece que tanta droga puede ser contraproducente. Cuando las combino con las 30 tazas de café diarias, la verdad es que no me siento bien y me da por expropiar vainas.
Necesito estar en plenitud de facultades para manejar el país. Porque no hay relevo. Yo quisiera encontrar a alguien que pudiera quitarme esta carga, aunque sea por 24 horas y sin querer quedarse allí permanentemente. Alguien dotado de mi misma claridad de visión y con mi misma capacidad de decisión. Pero que va. Veo a mi alrededor y me angustio. Luis me ayuda pero tiene sus limitaciones. Nicolás, Pedro y Cilia son muy mediocres y fastidiosos. Alí me engañó por un tiempo con su bastón y su porte serio y callado, pero ahora veo que es de los Rodriguez de Isaías, Jorge y Angel, simples muchachos de mandado.
Coño, es que ya no puedo ni comer tranquilo. El cubano que prueba mi comida se la despacha casi toda y me deja apenas unos retallones, a cuenta de la seguridad y la vaina. Dependo más y más del café negro porque no me gusta el licor. Es malo para los atletas. Yo siempre quise ser un atleta profesional y todavía le pegué antenoche un par de líneas a Francisco, otro Rodríguez. Pero creo que me la puso bombita por congraciarse conmigo.
Esta vaina de cambiar a Venezuela es macha. A veces me parece que ni yo lo voy a lograr. No lo logró Bolívar, aquel zambo maravilloso, no lo logró Gómez. Yo he tenido más dinero y eso me ha ayudado. Los políticos del hemisferio no aguantan un cañonazo de un millón de dólares, como decía el mexicano aquel, Artigas? Cuando le dí a Evo los treinta millones de dólares por televisión sentí que se estaba meando de la emoción. Pero el indiecito tuvo las bolas de preguntarme si iban a ser mensuales! Cuando le di las maletas con la plata a Cristina me sonrió mucho. Quien si se muestra codicioso todo el tiempo es Daniél, un carajo muy desordenado. La mujer lo tiene dominado y la verdad es que la mujer... Pero bueno, entre gustos y colores….
Me ha costado cambiar la gente en Venezuela porque aceptan mi dinero pero no aceptan mis ideas. Yo todo lo que deseo es integrar a Venezuela con Cuba, ser presidente de Venecuba. Recibir la banda presidencial de manos del tata, antes que se muera. Pero la gente aquí se resiste. Hacen chistes, me dicen que estoy ponchao, no se alzan pero tampoco se someten, es una vaina desesperante. Han estado mál acostumbrados por muchos años al libertinaje adeco y no tienen la disciplina social de los cubanos para aceptar el baño de totuma y la libreta de racionamiento. En especial los banqueros y los pedevesos me han decepcionado. Son hábiles. Les doy la manera de enriquecerse y me pagan como Arné, con escándalos que me han perjudicado. Les he dicho a Wilmer y a José Vicente que están bajo observación y que si se resbalan los expropio. Creo que se les ha pasado la mano en sus marramucias. Meter a Pedro preso será la mejor señal para que José Vicente se quede quieto y se concentre en jalar bolas.
Lo importante ahora es la asamblea. Tengo que arreglar las cosas para que quede en nuestras manos y los escuálidos ganen unos puestecitos que convaliden nuestra supremacía. Hay que dejarlos pegar unos griticos en la asamblea para que crean que me van a joder. Menos mál que la gente que tengo en el CNE es de confianza. Pero, como decia Betancourt, la gente es de confianza hasta que te mete una puñalada por el fundillo. Aquí hay que estar mosca todo el tiempo, si hasta Baduel me quiso joder, después que me traía el café.
Bueno, déjame tratar de dormir unas tres horitas, aprovechando que Carlos Escarrá está con los cubanos, cuidándome la puerta. Ese si es fiel, carajo. Otro que me ha ayudado mucho y quizás me lo traiga al país para darle lo que siempre quiso es Chaderton.
Buenas noches, comandante….buenas noches Fidel.
Dios mio, concédeme lo que quiero, seguirle sirviendo a Venezuela por treinta años más.
Amén.
sábado, 13 de febrero de 2010
"Lo apoyo por ser Chileno"... a pesar de ser indigno?
Kant: nunca hubiera entrado a la OEA.La Secretaría General de la Organización de Estados Americanos será decidida en Marzo 2010. Hasta ahora existe solo un candidato: José Miguél Insulza, el actual Secretario General. Su actuación ha sido lamentable. Insulza ha traicionado todos los principios sobre los cuales debería basarse la acción de la organización. Ha invitado a la Cuba del sanguinario dictador, Fidel Castro, a reingresar a la institución. Ha hostigado a Honduras, tratando de reintegrar a Zelaya a la presidencia después que este hombre trató de violar la constitución de la república. Ha mostrado una debilidad patológica frente a Chávez, incluyendo su negativa a admitir, en el Congreso de USA, contra toda evidencia, que Chávez apoyaba a las FARC.
José Miguél Insulza es una verguenza para los millones de ciudadanos del hemisferio que creen en la democracia y en la libertad.
La victoria de Sebastián Piñera en Chile nos hizo pensar que esa pesadilla en la OEA terminaría. Sin el apoyo del nuevo presidente de Chile Insulza no tendría muchas posibilidades de re-elección. Y Piñera daba todas las indicaciones de juzgar severamente a Insulza desde el punto de vista más importante, el ético. Hace no más de un mes Piñera afirmaba publicamente que la actuación de Insulza en la OEA “dejaba mucho que desear”.
Pero, la noticia que nos llega ahora de Chile es que Piñera apoyará la re-elección de Insulza por ser ella “una cuestión de estado”.
Quisiera que alguien me explicara que significa esto de una “cuestión de estado”. Suena bastante difuso. Mucho más precisa es la cuestión ética. Mál comenzaría su presidencia Sebastián Piñera apoyando la sinverguenzura de un Secretario General de la OEA indigno de ese cargo, solo porque “es Chileno”. A menos que el mundo se haya vuelto patas arriba, todo es posible, no es posible aceptar que la nacionalidad de la persona predomine sobre su calidad ética. Tal manera de pensar es característica de los caudillos ignorantes a lo Chávez u Ortega. Pero Piñera? No es este el hombre de empresas moderno quien nos anuncia un gobierno de nuevas maravillas?
El Secretario General de una organización que pretenda representar con dignidad a los habitantes de nuestro hemisferio tiene que ser una persona sin miedo a los déspotas, dispuesto a hacer cumplir los reglamentos y estatutos de la organización. No puede ser un criptosocialista empeñado en destruir la democracia latinoamericana para aliviar sus viejos resentimientos.
No tengo dudas de que esta encrucijada de la OEA determinará su supervivencia o su desaparición. Si Insulza es re-electo, a pesar de lo que hizo y dejó de hacer en su primer período, la OEA probablemente terminará por desaparecer en la más completa ignominia. Los ciudadanos de la región pasarán de la indignación al rechazo abierto. En sus oficinas de Washington y del hemisferio solo habitarán los pequeños seres, cobrando sus sueldos mal habidos cada mes y los embajadores quienes representan gobiernos que consideran la “razón de estado” como más importante que la ética. Este grupo será feliz por haber encontrado la manera de vivir sin trabajar, una manera de lograr que la impunidad diplomática prevalezca por sobre la dignidad personal.
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