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La reciente demanda por cesación de pagos introducida contra
Venezuela en Washington DC por la empresa Gold Reserves (ver mi entrega anterior en este blog) es una de las más
graves pero no la única. A esta empresa
Maduro le debe $750 millones y no le quiere pagar. Solo ante el Banco Mundial
se han introducido 39 demandas en contra del régimen de Nicolás Maduro. Hace
poco la empresa Owens Illinois ganó una demanda de $455 millones en contra del
régimen, el cual se niega igualmente a pagar. Así sucede con otras demandas
perdias por el ruinoso régimen. La negativa a pagar las deudas contraídas por
la pandilla de salvajes que representa Maduro ha convertido su nombre en una
mala palabra, algo así como basura,
en el mundo financiero internacional y en las organizaciones multilaterales del
planeta. Se saldrá este salvaje con las
suyas negándose a pagar, mientras acaba de decir que seguirá comprando tnques,
aviones y misiles rusos?
Que sucede cuando el régimen maula venezolana se niega a pagar
sus deudas internacionales? El Inter American Dialogue, basado en Washington
DC, http://www.thedialogue.org/uploads/LAA/Daily/2015/LAA150331.pdf
, recoge la opinión de varios expertos sobre esta pregunta, las cuales
transcribo de seguidas, ver: :
El experto Ryan Mellske, associate
at Three Crowns LLP in Washington dice : "Grounds for annulment are limited (only
13 of 189 ICSID awards have been annulled), and Venezuela might not refuse to
pay the award simply because it must honor ICSID rulings to avoid default on
certain sovereign bonds. Still, when countries refuse to pay an award, an
investor can attempt to recover against assets held by the country in most
jurisdictions worldwide. An ICSID award is binding in all member states. Awards
rendered under the rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law are usually enforced by the national courts of all members to the New
York Convention. An investor can also pressure the country through, for
example, contract claims in commercial arbitration against the nation's
state-owned entity, claims in national courts against third parties who seek to
benefit from the country's wrongful acts and participation by other industry
stakeholders in negotiations. The investor may also call on its home state to
issue sanctions to induce compliance. These include denying trade benefits,
voting against extending loans from multilateral lending institutions and
reducing appropriations for foreign assistance. As a last resort, the
investor's home country could bring a claim against the non-paying state before
the International Court of Justice. Failure to comply with a judgment of the
ICJ could be referred to the U.N. Security Council….
Por su
parte Nigel Blackaby, co-head of international arbitration at
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer in Washington: "ICSID was founded by the 1965 ICSID Convention which
requires signatory states automatically to comply with awards. Article 53
states unequivocally, 'Each [state] party shall abide by and comply with the
terms of the award.' As a consequence, any country that fails to do so is in
breach of its international obligations to all other (roughly 160) signatories
to the ICSID Convention. The specific investment treaty will also likely oblige
a losing state to comply immediately with an award failing which it will be in
breach of its international obligations toward the other party to that treaty.
The consequence of these breaches of international law will increase the risk
profile (and thus the cost of borrowing and access to borrowing) of the
recalcitrant government. It may also cause those countries whose nationals have
not received payment of awards to vote negatively in multilateral funding
forums such as the IDB and the World Bank. Separately under Article 54 of the
ICSID Convention, the courts of the other signatory states have to recognize
and enforce that award as if it were a final judgment: 'Each Contracting State
shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding and
enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories
as if it were a final judgment of a court in that State.' So if a government
does not comply, the investor can start hunting for and freezing seizable state
assets. Ultimately, if a country wishes to participate in the international
community, it needs to comply with adverse awards. Even Argentina (which had
historically not complied with adverse awards) eventually recognized this fact
when in November 2013 it paid five long outstanding awards to British, U.S. and
French investors
Y el Sr.
Jaime Martínez Estévez, partner at
Rodner, Martínez & Asociados in Caracas agrega: "Venezuela
denounced its bilateral investment treaty with the Netherlands in 2008 and the
ICSID Convention in 2012. However, both continue to be binding for investments
made and arbitrations started prior to their terminations. Venezuelan officials
have expressed constitutional and political considerations for the withdrawals,
which could be used to justify ignoring the award. However, last year, Rafael
Ramírez, then Venezuela's foreign minister, welcomed an ICSID award in the
ExxonMobil case as a victory for Venezuela. Procedural actions could delay
enforcement. Venezuela questioned the jurisdiction and is likely to request the
revision and/or annulment of the decision, as it has done in other cases.
Political arguments could be used to delay payment negotiations, as well.
Venezuela's pressing economic situation, particularly its level of
international reserves, would invite delaying tactics. In the current political
and economic circumstances, an award refusal could occur regardless of the
forum. ICSID enforcement conditions are better than those under the New York
Convention. Annulment claims have to be settled in accordance with Article 52
of the ICSID Convention, and there is no appeal or recourse (other than per the
convention) for enforcement in any of the 159 signatory countries. A refusal
will have a negative effect on the prospects and cost of new investments.
Venezuela would be induced to payment negotiations to avoid seizure of assets
abroad and the increased cost of a forced payment. Plaintiffs will seek
freezing assets in advance, based on Article 47 of the convention."
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mientras tanto, sigue comprando chatarra bélica de Putin
Es decir, todos los expertos coinciden en que la negativa a pagar convertiría al régimen de Maduro en un paria, en forajido,
como ya está definido politicamente y abriría las puertas de inmediato a
sanciones económicas por parte de los países cuyas empresas se encuentran
afectadas, en especial los Estados Unidos.
Cada dia que pasa el régimen de
Maduro se aisla más de la comunidad internacional y se limita a descansar en
Cuba, China y en un cada vez más acosado Vladimir Putin, quien seguirá apoyando
a Maduro mientras le siga comprando su bisutería bélica. El pandillero es uno de sus mejores clientes.
