“The Chavezjad Doctrine: Between Myth and Speculation” by Michael Shifter, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2215 is an elegant and welcome analysis of the unusual liaison between two political leaders, Chavez and Ahmadinejad, rather than between two countries. The links are much more personal than institutional, the product of their common hatred of the United States.
I would like to make a few comments about this excellent essay. One has to do with the title. Shifter mentions myth and speculation to describe the relationship. However, much of it is already factual, no longer mythical or speculative. The fact that some of the claims being made in relation to this link are unsubstantiated does not diminish its gravity.
Michael Shifter says: “Chavez has naturally sought to make friends across the globe -- if for no other purpose than to irk Washington. No alliance has been as satisfying for Chavez in this regard as the one he has developed with Iran, which has grown especially close since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005”. Although irking Washington certainly is a reason for the liaison is probably not the main one. Going beyond regional borders to establish anti-U.S. alliances responds to Chavez’s vision of himself as a Latin American Mahdi, “the chosen one”, the man who would lead the charge against the “evil empire”.
For Shifter the key question is “whether the Venezuela-Iran relationship can best be understood as merely a political alliance –that is, a byproduct of self-interested jockeying and rapidly shifting poles of power in the world --or rather as something more sinister meriting an energetic response from the United States and other governments concerned about peace and security in the Americas”. I believe the U.S. would do well in assuming the second explanation as correct. Even if the relationship started along the lines of a simple political alliance, the dynamics of what Shifter defines as the “rapidly shifting poles of power” have progressively led to a dangerous game of complicity that could end in hostile actions against the U.S.
Shifter correctly describes the known facts about the Venezuela-Iran relationship but tends to play down indications that would seem to be well established. For example, the presence of Hezbollah sympathizers in the Island of Margarita, an area that has become a center of financial support to that group. The Teheran-Caracas daily flights have been described in the U.S. Congress as carrying Islamic terrorists. In Venezuela they would be given false identities to try to penetrate into U.S territory. Chavez’s closing of the Israeli Embassy in Caracas and the vandalizing of the Caracas synagogue certainly go beyond simple rhetoric. It can properly be said that Chavez has become an active ally of Ahmadinejad in what amounts to a systematic confrontation with the United States. Chavez’s promise to deliver Iran some 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day, in defiance of an international decision to block such deliveries to that country, represents a clear example of how far he is prepared to help his ally.
In describing the relationship Shifter classifies Chavez as the “moderate partner”. He says: “The catch is that while Chavez is seen largely as a nuisance by the international community, Ahmadinejad is regarded as a threat because he is believed to be actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program and simultaneously obstructing U.N. demands for inspections of Iranian facilities. His repeated denial of the Holocaust, virulent remarks against Israel, support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and the systematic crackdown on the Iranian opposition after the contested outcome of the June elections testify to the nefarious character of the regime. In this sense, Chavez comes off as the moderate one in the relationship”
In this connection, we should remember that Chavez also denies the Holocaust, also speaks virulently against Israel and also supports Hamas and Hezbollah (In Lebanon Hamas has openly called him a valuable friend). Although less violently than Ahmadinejad, he is also cracking down on the Venezuelan opposition after imposing an illegal referendum last year in order to become president for life. In the Latin American scale, where “dictaduras” (dictatorships) are often “dictablandas” (authoritarianism), the Chavez’ regime should probably be defined as repressive, rather than simply oppressive.
Shifter calls the claim that Iran is laundering money through its Venezuelan link “unsubstantiated, although plausible”. As asserted by Robert Morgenthau in his presentation at Brookings, in Washington DC, it is a fact that Iran has established a bank in Venezuela, called International Development Bank, IDB, a branch of Bank Saderat. What Morgenthau did not say that night, although he most probably knows it, is that this Iranian bank has made or is making transactions with Venezuelan banks that have branches in the U.S., obtaining at least a theoretical access to the U.S. financial sector.
Shifter asks: “Aside from opportunities for grandstanding and symbolic gestures, what does Chavez get from the relationship?” And his answer is: “apparently, not too much”. I think Chavez is obtaining much more than that. His objective is not material gain but political gain. He wants to be perceived as the Latin American leader of an anti-U.S. global alliance. His alignment with Ahmadinejad reinforces this perception. Shifter believes that the link “ hurts Chavez’s relationships with potential allies in Europe and even in Latin America that are worried about Iran’s nuclear aims. And it is not even clear that the relationship helps Chavez politically at home”. Chavez’s mind seems to work along different lines. He might not be worried about losing potential allies in Europe or Latin America or, even, some following at home. He believes in a major global conflict between the haves and the have-nots and he is determined to become the leader or, at least, one of the major leaders of the have-nots: peasants, the poor, indigenous groups, and all those who feel nostalgic about a socialist world. In this sense he is as much a fundamentalist as Ahmadinejad, if not even more so. Ahmadinejad’s objectives are probably similar. They have a lot to do with matters of the soul, although making political inroads in Latin America is a welcome additional benefit.
Shifter correctly speaks of a probable link of Chavez with the Colombian FARC but says that the relationship between them is “still-murky” and that “no smoking gun exists”. Some of the findings and events in this connection could already be defined as smoking guns, including the existence of weapons sold by Sweden to Venezuela and found in the hands of the FARC. There are recent reports of rifles and ammunitions belonging to the Venezuelan Army barracks at Valencia, in the state of Carabobo, found in the hands of the FARC. The recent meeting in Caracas of the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana, CCB, promoted by the Chavez regime, made a point of naming FARC dead leader Manuel Marulanda and current FARC leader Alfonso Cano as “Honorary Presidents” of the meeting.
In talking about the U.S. – Venezuela relationship Shifter says: “It is true that with Obama the tone of the discourse coming from Washington has markedly moderated, and the image of the United States is far more favorable than it had been”. I would agree with the first half of the statement, not with the second. In moderating its discourse towards the Venezuelan regime the image of the United States might have lost ground in the eyes of millions of democracy-loving Latin Americans. A recent survey by LatinoBarometro lists Chavez as the worst ranked president in Latin America. A more moderate discourse by the U.S. could be out of synchrony with this perception.
Shifter describes correctly how the two leaders are experiencing increasing domestic political problems and how these problems might weaken their inter-continental alliance: “Iran and Venezuela currently have their hands full, not only in their wider regions of the Middle East and Latin America respectively, but, perhaps most crucially on the domestic fronts. Such circumstances make a robust relationship very difficult. Chavez and Ahmadinejad's chief priority is the perpetuation of power at home, without which it will be virtually impossible to deepen ties across the globe”.
At the end of the essay Shifter seems to suggest the probability of a medium term collapse of the Chavez regime. We fully concur with this assessment.
I would like to make a few comments about this excellent essay. One has to do with the title. Shifter mentions myth and speculation to describe the relationship. However, much of it is already factual, no longer mythical or speculative. The fact that some of the claims being made in relation to this link are unsubstantiated does not diminish its gravity.
Michael Shifter says: “Chavez has naturally sought to make friends across the globe -- if for no other purpose than to irk Washington. No alliance has been as satisfying for Chavez in this regard as the one he has developed with Iran, which has grown especially close since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005”. Although irking Washington certainly is a reason for the liaison is probably not the main one. Going beyond regional borders to establish anti-U.S. alliances responds to Chavez’s vision of himself as a Latin American Mahdi, “the chosen one”, the man who would lead the charge against the “evil empire”.
For Shifter the key question is “whether the Venezuela-Iran relationship can best be understood as merely a political alliance –that is, a byproduct of self-interested jockeying and rapidly shifting poles of power in the world --or rather as something more sinister meriting an energetic response from the United States and other governments concerned about peace and security in the Americas”. I believe the U.S. would do well in assuming the second explanation as correct. Even if the relationship started along the lines of a simple political alliance, the dynamics of what Shifter defines as the “rapidly shifting poles of power” have progressively led to a dangerous game of complicity that could end in hostile actions against the U.S.
Shifter correctly describes the known facts about the Venezuela-Iran relationship but tends to play down indications that would seem to be well established. For example, the presence of Hezbollah sympathizers in the Island of Margarita, an area that has become a center of financial support to that group. The Teheran-Caracas daily flights have been described in the U.S. Congress as carrying Islamic terrorists. In Venezuela they would be given false identities to try to penetrate into U.S territory. Chavez’s closing of the Israeli Embassy in Caracas and the vandalizing of the Caracas synagogue certainly go beyond simple rhetoric. It can properly be said that Chavez has become an active ally of Ahmadinejad in what amounts to a systematic confrontation with the United States. Chavez’s promise to deliver Iran some 20,000 barrels of gasoline per day, in defiance of an international decision to block such deliveries to that country, represents a clear example of how far he is prepared to help his ally.
In describing the relationship Shifter classifies Chavez as the “moderate partner”. He says: “The catch is that while Chavez is seen largely as a nuisance by the international community, Ahmadinejad is regarded as a threat because he is believed to be actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program and simultaneously obstructing U.N. demands for inspections of Iranian facilities. His repeated denial of the Holocaust, virulent remarks against Israel, support for terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, and the systematic crackdown on the Iranian opposition after the contested outcome of the June elections testify to the nefarious character of the regime. In this sense, Chavez comes off as the moderate one in the relationship”
In this connection, we should remember that Chavez also denies the Holocaust, also speaks virulently against Israel and also supports Hamas and Hezbollah (In Lebanon Hamas has openly called him a valuable friend). Although less violently than Ahmadinejad, he is also cracking down on the Venezuelan opposition after imposing an illegal referendum last year in order to become president for life. In the Latin American scale, where “dictaduras” (dictatorships) are often “dictablandas” (authoritarianism), the Chavez’ regime should probably be defined as repressive, rather than simply oppressive.
Shifter calls the claim that Iran is laundering money through its Venezuelan link “unsubstantiated, although plausible”. As asserted by Robert Morgenthau in his presentation at Brookings, in Washington DC, it is a fact that Iran has established a bank in Venezuela, called International Development Bank, IDB, a branch of Bank Saderat. What Morgenthau did not say that night, although he most probably knows it, is that this Iranian bank has made or is making transactions with Venezuelan banks that have branches in the U.S., obtaining at least a theoretical access to the U.S. financial sector.
Shifter asks: “Aside from opportunities for grandstanding and symbolic gestures, what does Chavez get from the relationship?” And his answer is: “apparently, not too much”. I think Chavez is obtaining much more than that. His objective is not material gain but political gain. He wants to be perceived as the Latin American leader of an anti-U.S. global alliance. His alignment with Ahmadinejad reinforces this perception. Shifter believes that the link “ hurts Chavez’s relationships with potential allies in Europe and even in Latin America that are worried about Iran’s nuclear aims. And it is not even clear that the relationship helps Chavez politically at home”. Chavez’s mind seems to work along different lines. He might not be worried about losing potential allies in Europe or Latin America or, even, some following at home. He believes in a major global conflict between the haves and the have-nots and he is determined to become the leader or, at least, one of the major leaders of the have-nots: peasants, the poor, indigenous groups, and all those who feel nostalgic about a socialist world. In this sense he is as much a fundamentalist as Ahmadinejad, if not even more so. Ahmadinejad’s objectives are probably similar. They have a lot to do with matters of the soul, although making political inroads in Latin America is a welcome additional benefit.
Shifter correctly speaks of a probable link of Chavez with the Colombian FARC but says that the relationship between them is “still-murky” and that “no smoking gun exists”. Some of the findings and events in this connection could already be defined as smoking guns, including the existence of weapons sold by Sweden to Venezuela and found in the hands of the FARC. There are recent reports of rifles and ammunitions belonging to the Venezuelan Army barracks at Valencia, in the state of Carabobo, found in the hands of the FARC. The recent meeting in Caracas of the Coordinadora Continental Bolivariana, CCB, promoted by the Chavez regime, made a point of naming FARC dead leader Manuel Marulanda and current FARC leader Alfonso Cano as “Honorary Presidents” of the meeting.
In talking about the U.S. – Venezuela relationship Shifter says: “It is true that with Obama the tone of the discourse coming from Washington has markedly moderated, and the image of the United States is far more favorable than it had been”. I would agree with the first half of the statement, not with the second. In moderating its discourse towards the Venezuelan regime the image of the United States might have lost ground in the eyes of millions of democracy-loving Latin Americans. A recent survey by LatinoBarometro lists Chavez as the worst ranked president in Latin America. A more moderate discourse by the U.S. could be out of synchrony with this perception.
Shifter describes correctly how the two leaders are experiencing increasing domestic political problems and how these problems might weaken their inter-continental alliance: “Iran and Venezuela currently have their hands full, not only in their wider regions of the Middle East and Latin America respectively, but, perhaps most crucially on the domestic fronts. Such circumstances make a robust relationship very difficult. Chavez and Ahmadinejad's chief priority is the perpetuation of power at home, without which it will be virtually impossible to deepen ties across the globe”.
At the end of the essay Shifter seems to suggest the probability of a medium term collapse of the Chavez regime. We fully concur with this assessment.
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I take this opportunity to congratulate Michael for being named president of the Inter American Dialogue, a position that has been very ably held for some years by retiring Peter Hakim.
I take this opportunity to congratulate Michael for being named president of the Inter American Dialogue, a position that has been very ably held for some years by retiring Peter Hakim.
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