Venezuela remains at the bottom of most international rankings that compare social and economic progress among nations. This is true of quality of governance, transparency in the management of the public wealth, global competitiveness, alimentary self-sufficiency and many other aspects of national life. I believe that some of the main reasons for this sad state of affairs have to do with the existence of at least five dogmas and/or myths cultivated by the Venezuelan political leadership. There are more but these five will illustrate the issue.
Myth1. The State requires total control
of basic industries.
In Venezuela governments of
different political tendencies have maintained for decades that the state
should have total control over the so-called basic industries. A large part of the problem lies in the
definition of what is a basic industry. In the U.S., for example, no industry
is as basic that should be in control of the state, not even the industry of
armaments. In Venezuela the concept of basic includes almost everything: oil, iron,
steel, aluminum, weapons, while there is always political pressure to include
others such as pharmaceuticals, aviation, banking and even tourism. At the very
least the government will insist in having its “national airline”, a hotel
chain, worker’s and women’s banks and will strictly regulate pricing of
medicines and hospital care or what is taught in elementary and secondary
schools. Nowhere is this ideological
strait jacket more damaging than in the oil industry. From the extreme left to
the extreme right most Venezuelan political actors agree on state control of
the oil industry and consider it an almost religious dogma. As a result the
Venezuelan oil industry has never belonged to the nation but to the state. In
Venezuela state has often been synonymous with the small group in power, sometimes
only one man. As a result oil income has never benefited the people at large. Venezuela
has never been able to use oil income in an efficient and transparent manner.
To dismantle this myth about state control will be difficult but essential if
the country ever wants to escape from the third world.
Myth 2. Social vindication in Venezuela
can be done by putting money in the pockets of the poor
Even prominent private
entrepreneurs, like young Venezuelan businessman Alberto Vollmer, will tell you
that Hugo Chavez made social vindication of the poor a cornerstone of his
government. Hugo Chavez as a champion of the poor has become part of the
international lore, just as Che Guevara has become a martyr. This is a very
harmful myth as it sanctifies the policy of direct subsidies and handouts that
characterized the 14 years of ruinous Hugo Chavez regime. From Ramonet to
Weisbrot to Monedero, international hired guns of the defunct leader have sung
the praises of Chavez as a modern Robin Hood, taking away from the rich to give
to the poor. Although it is true that substantial amounts of money have been
transferred to the poor as a result of Chavez policy of handouts, it is also
true that this mechanism has been motivated by a desire to consolidate
political power. It has not made possible a real escape from poverty for the
millions of Venezuelans who received its temporary benefits. Insulin will cure
diabetes only if given throughout the life of the diabetic. The day is not administered
diabetes returns. Today the Venezuelan poor are as “diabetic” as ever, as oil
money has essentially run out. Redistributing wealth could be an acceptable
strategy only as long as wealth increases. If it remains the same or, even,
diminishes, as has been the case in Venezuela, redistribution leads to the
impoverishment of all, not to a satisfactory equalization of income. Chavez’s handouts were the proverbial fish a
day, never the teaching of how to fish. Today, millions who were dependent in
the welfare state of Mr. Chavez are over dependent in a state no longer prodigal,
since it approaches financial ruin.
Myth 3. The Venezuelan armed
force as a protector of democracy and freedom
The Venezuelan military
represents an untouchable caste, the object of political flattery and distinction,
its true nature masked by its motto: FORJADOR DE LIBERTADES = defenders of freedom.
In fact, the Venezuelan armed force has rarely been a defender of our freedom. More
often, it has been an accomplice of dictatorships, such as Gomez’s and Perez
Jimenez’s in the 20th century and of the autocratic and abusive Hugo
Chavez regime in this century. Even during our democratic periods the armed force
has been a nest of intrigue and military promotions a highly politicized
affair. The military have been supporters and beneficiaries of dictatorial regimes,
up to the level of being co-chairs in the running of the government. Perez
Jimenez was a military dictator and so was Chavez, who went farther than Perez
Jimenez in installing a military regime, with over 100 active members of the
armed force holding high-level bureaucratic positions. During Chavez presidency
the military even allowed the presence of terrorist groups in Venezuela (FARC,
ETA, possibly Hezbollah) while several of the high-ranking generals have been connected
with drug trafficking, named as such by the U.S. government.
Still, some members of the
opposition still believe in the essential purity of the Venezuelan military.
Alberto Franceschi, a well-known analyst in the opposition says: “How many
corrupt military officers are there? More than during the past governments, I
would say, but not the majority. The corrupt minority does not represent the
Venezuelan armed force. For each corrupt officer there are 24 who are not”. He
goes on to say: “since they have the monopoly of weapons the temptation [for
corruption] is naturally greater”.
Franceschi even says the military are forced to shout: “Fatherland, socialism
or death” because they would be punished if they don’t do it, an explanation
that I find unacceptable.
In previous articles I have said
that the Venezuelan armed force should be eliminated, something that probably
will not happen in the foreseeable future, due to the simple fact that they
have the power and are not willing to commit suicide. They are a significant financial
and ethical dead weight that keeps dragging Venezuela into the lower levels of
the third world.
Myth 4. The dialog of the
opposition with the Venezuelan regime is essential to national reconciliation
In 1938 Churchill said, talking
about the policy of appeasement practiced by the government of Neville
Chamberlain: “there can never be friendship between the British democracy and
Nazi power, a power that spurns Christian ethics, which vaunts the spirit of
aggression, which derives strength from persecution”. What Nazism was to European
democracy and freedom in those years Chavism is to the Venezuela of today, a
formidable agent of national destruction. And yet, there are increasing voices
of appeasement in Venezuela, asking for dialogue and reconciliation with the
gangsters who are in control of the Venezuelan government and who have, for 15
long years and with the complicity of the armed forces, killed, prosecuted,
imprisoned, expropriated, exiled, insulted and abused millions of Venezuelans
who did not agree with their autocratic philosophy of government. The rogue
government has established relations with the worst regimes in the planet:
Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Belarus and Syria, among others.
This is a moral problem, much
more so than a political problem. Pragmatism is one thing, surrendering our principles
and values is something entirely different. We cannot seat around a table and
part bread or smoke the pipe of peace with people who reject the values we
cherish. We would do this at the risk of losing our national soul. Venezuela
will need justice, not a turning of the page, if it ever wants redemption and
proper retribution.
Myth 5. Venezuelan Corruption can
be combatted by structuring new laws, passing a new constitution and/or giving
the president special powers.
After 28 constitutions, the
current one a monster of 350 articles, excessively prescriptive in its
regulation of the smallest detail of Venezuelan life, and after several verbose
versions of anti-corruption laws the country ranks today as one of the
ten most corrupt societies in the world, according to Transparency
International. In particular, the regime that has been in power for the last 15
years has been the most corrupt in Venezuelan history, to judge by the amounts
of money stolen and by its systemic dimensions. Corruption is the only
“democratic” component of a regime since it has allowed almost every one of
their followers, and even a few of their adversaries, to get their hands into
the national treasury.
Venezuela is one of the most
over-regulated societies on earth while being one of the most corrupt. Corruption
is not a genetic trait but intensively cultural, made possible by the attitudes
adopted by governments and governed about their handling of the oil income.
While only about 30,000 Venezuelans would be needed to run the oil company and
to generate the current oil income, there are 120,000 employees in the company, 2.3 million are in the payroll of
national and state government and about 7 million followers of the regime
(according the latest election results) are, directly or indirectly, getting
paid by the prodigal state to keep being loyal to the people in power. This has
led to a corruption orgy that, after 15 years, has left the finances of the
nation in ruins. And now, suddenly, the government says that they are most
eager to clean up their act and that, to do this, the president needs special
powers to enact new anti-corruption laws. The opposition replies that no
special powers are needed and some are increasingly calling for a Constituent
Assembly that would, among other things, pass a new constitution. More rhetoric
and laws but no action.
Few are calling for attitudinal
changes, which are at the essence of the cure. Venezuela is hooked in the
pretense of a cure, rather than on the cure itself. A hundred years from now, probably
after we pass yet another constitution, the country will be as corrupt as ever.
Provided there is a country.
4 comentarios:
“Myth 2. Social vindication in Venezuela can be done by putting money in the pockets of the poor”
Of course, social vindication cannot be done by putting money in the pockets of the poor, but, putting the oil revenues of the nation in the pockets of all its citizens, will lead to the citizens’ independence from its government, and that benefits, perhaps even primarily, the poor.
Who are we to deny one the poor their chances of using their part of the oil revenues better than how it is used in their name by the government?
http://www.petropolitan.blogspot.com/
Mito 2: no sólo no enseñaron a pescar, es que el pescado entregado estaba podrido (Pudreval, etc.)
A better translation of "forjador" would be "forger", that comes from "forge", especially for this meaning: "to make or produce a fraudulent imitation of (a signature, banknote, etc) or to commit forgery"
El problema no es la Constituyente, que debe ser convocada para redactar un documento simple. El problema es la oportunidad de su convocatoria. ¿Será posible que haya ingenuos que creen que pueden hacer algo convocando una ANTES de salir de este régimen?
Yo creo en una Constituyente, en el sentido dicho en el primer párrafo, DESPUES de desalojar al chavismo del poder, para limpiar el Estado y re-institucionalizarlo.
Otra cosa en la corrupción. Es tarea de educación en valores y sanciones draconianas. Ese es el asunto: no sólo tenemos un problema económico, uno político y uno social; el principal -y todos son importantes- es el problema moral, en lo cual tiene responsabilidad, también, la industria del entretenimiento (*). Su amigo Pasquali lo viene diciendo desde hace más de 50 años.
(*) Acabo de leer en ND que creo una revista publicó como una gran gracia los cortes de cabello que se deberían hacer las mujeres para evitar ser víctimas de la barbarie de quienes están cortando cabelleras para venderlas como implantes de pelo. Otro síntoma de la decadencia nuestra.
Publicar un comentario