****Buenas intenciones pero malos consejos
Wilson
Center es una de las instituciones pensantes más prestigiosas de Washington DC
y de los Estados Unidos. Su actividad cubre los más diversos temas y casi todas
las áreas del globo. Entre varios programas de gran aliento tiene uno sobre América Latina, en el cual se
discuten los asuntos políticos, sociales y económicos de esa región del mundo,
ver:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/program/latin-american-program. Uno de los más recientes documentos emanados de ese programa tiene como
tema a Venezuela: “Venezuela: is there a way out of its tragic impasse?” de
Abraham Lowenthal y David Smilde, el cual ofrece una solución negociada a la
crisis en nuestro país, la cual lleva ya unos 20 años de angustioso y ruinoso
desarrollo. He leído este documento , el cual puede verse en Inglés y en Español
en los siguientes lazos: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lowenthal_and_smilde_final_0.pdf, y https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/spanish-lowenthal_and_smilde_final.pdf con especial
interés y he hecho comentarios en Inglés, los cuales aparecen más abajo. Sin
embargo, deseo hacer una síntesis de esos comentarios en Español para los
efectos de mi blog www.lasarmasdecoronel.blogspot.co. Estos comentarios en Inglés fueron enviados a uno de los
autores, D. Smilde, pero no he recibido
hasta ahora ninguna respuesta sobre ellos, excepto una cortés nota de acuse de
recibo de la Directora del programa.
Creo que los
autores, ambos de sólidas credenciales académicas, tienen las mejores
intenciones pero sus recomendaciones presentan un riesgo de que, de aceptarse,
produzcan un efecto más perjudicial que beneficioso para la Venezuela del
futuro. Resumo de seguidas los puntos en los cuales estoy en desacuerdo:
1. A fin de proponer una negociación los autores aceptan
tener una base de confianza en la sinceridad de propósitos del régimen de
Nicolás Maduro y lo aceptan como legítimo. Yo creo que este es un grave error.
El régimen de Nicolás Maduro es ilegítimo de origen y de comportamiento y es un
error confiar en sus buenos propósitos;
2. A fin de validarlo los autores minimizan la grave
situación de dependencia del régimen de Maduro en Cuba y afirman que no puede
calificarse de un “Estado Mafioso”. Difiero de estas generosas apreciaciones;
3. Como estrategia, los autores nos recomiendan hablar
“discretamente” con Maduro mientras seguimos peleando abiertamente con él. Este
es un consejo que no debe ser aceptado porque casi seguramente llevaría al
rechazo popular de negociaciones clandestinas.
4. Los autores proponen darle garantías a los personeros
claves del régimen de que serán respetados, de que no habrá revancha, de que
habrá protección de sus intereses. Aunque los autores no excluyen la
posibilidad de aplicar justicia, claramente subordinan esta necesidad al éxito
de la negociación. Esto es bastante más de lo que el país debe aceptar.
5. Los autores recomiendan incluir en el proceso de
transición a aquellos personeros civiles y militares del régimen de aduro que expresen
el deseo de seguir participando. Esto suena a amnistía general, puesto que
estos personeros expresarán este deseo, sobre todo si se les permite guardar
sus dineros mal habidos;
6. Los autores postulan la necesidad de “aceptar y ser
tolerantes” aun cuando la justicia no sea debidamente aplicada. Este es un mal
consejo, realmente inaceptable;
En líneas generales, estamos en desacuerdo con el
documento de Lowenthal y Smilde porque sus aspiraciones son de una victoria
temporal, de una especie de tregua,
dejando en pe los cimientos podridos del régimen que arruinó a Venezuela. Para
que Venezuela cambie, debe existir una lección ejemplarizante, debe existir
justicia. Debe enviarse al país el mensaje de que el crimen no paga. De otra
manera, estaríamos barriendo la basura debajo de la alfombra, pretendiendo que el hogar está limpio.
MIS COMENTARIOS
EN INGLÉS, EN MAYOR DETALLE:
Lowenthal
and Smilde’s proposed solution for Venezuela underestimates the ethical
component
Comments on a Wilson Center Policy Brief on
Venezuela.
See the full document in:
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/lowenthal_and_smilde_final_0.pdf, English version. And
Spanish Version:
A 4400 word policy brief on Venezuela
published by the Wilson Center and authored by Abraham Lowenthal and David Smilde
builds on previous work of both authors to propose a negotiated solution to the
Venezuelan tragedy. Lowenthal is a co-editor, with Sergio Bittar, of a volume
on “Democratic Transitions”, in which they present several cases in which negotiated
transitions from dictatorships to democracy have taken place. Smilde is a
professor at Tulane University, a member of WOLA, The Washington Office on
Latin America and has written before on the desirability of a negotiated
solution for Venezuela. This paper represents a significant, scholarly,
contribution to the study of the possible solutions for the Venezuelan crisis,
one which – we all agree- has become a great Latin American tragedy. It adds to
the already significant amount of recommendations about the Venezuelan crisis
made by international political scientists and diplomats and to the official
position of several governments, especially in Europe, which advocate a
negotiated solution to the Venezuelan crisis. However, theirs is far from being
an unanimous position, as there are important countries and individuals that oppose
such a way out. Within Venezuela the opposition behind Juan Guaido essentially
rejects this solution since they do not trust the motivations of the dictatorial
government of Nicolas Maduro. Popular sentiment in Venezuela, as measured by
different polls, clearly runs against further negotiations between the
opposition and the Maduro regime.
Reading this paper by Lowenthal and Smilde I
am of the opinion that it promotes a solution to the Venezuelan crisis that
rings illusory and transmits a misleading perception of reality, based on well
–intentioned but equivocal or incomplete data, while underestimating the
importance of the ethical component of the issue.
Below I offer my comments.
FIRST
COMMENT
I find the solution proposed in the paper mostly
illusory because it appears to be based on the assumption that the Nicolas Maduro
regime can be trusted as a sincere interlocutor. It is unlikely that the authors
would have advocated a negotiation with the regime unless they could feel they
could trust it. The paper by Lowenthal and Smilde indeed suggests this is the
case when they say: “Before Chávez assumed his new term, it
became clear that he was mortally ill, and he named Maduro as his designated
successor. Maduro won the presidency in his own right in 2013, in highly contested
and very close elections that were generally considered reliable, if not
entirely free and fair”. The authors declare Maduro a legitimate president,
stating that he won his presidency in a manner considered “reliable”. Therefore, they see him as a valid interlocutor,
morally equivalent to the opposition. There is considerable evidence against this assumption,
which indicates that Maduro is an usurper, lacking in legitimacy of origin and,
even more so, in illegitimacy of performance, having become a cruel, inept and corrupt
dictatorship. Venezuelans condemn Maduro in overwhelming numbers. They are
tired of attempts at dialogue and consider them, on the basis of previous
experience, as false strategies by Maduro to gain time and to consolidate political
power. This is the reason why the
opposition has so far rejected most attempts at further negotiations. They feel
they are being deceived and consider many of the Venezuelan political leaders who
keep promoting dialogue with Maduro as collaborationists. This is the case of
the group including Timoteo Zambrano, Claudio Fermin, Henri Falcon, Felipe
Mujica and other lesser figures.
SECOND
COMMENT
In order to give substance to their call for
a negotiation the authors feel necessary to give Maduro an acceptable profile.
They say, among other things: “Venezuela is not, in fact, more repressive
than Pinochet’s Chile, or more polarized than South Africa was under apartheid.
Nor is it more constrained by its ties to Cuba than Poland was by its links to
Russia. Representing Venezuela as a “mafia state” confuses more than it
clarifies. Venezuela does have extensive corruption as well as government and
military involvement in illicit markets, but such terms as “cartel,” “mafia
state” and “narcostate” overestimate the degree of articulation and coherence
of these criminal networks”.
In other words, the authors tell us that Maduro
is not that bad. Political Dependence
on Cuba, membership in a transnational kleptocratic gang, extensive drug
trafficking, large scale money laundering, none of these peccadillos – intimate
the authors - should be deal breakers and could be glossed over in order to end
the Venezuelan tragedy. I find this approach lacking in an essential ingredient
of any valid solution for Venezuela, which is the ethical component. Over one
hundred Maduro relatives, ministers, collaborators and military supporters have
been individually sanctioned by the U.S., Canada and Latin America and European
governments. Are these sanctions to be disregarded as inconsequential? I would find
such an approach morally deficient. I agree that there should be a sense of urgency
about a Venezuelan solution. But after 20 years of silence and, even, of
political support, by many members of international academia regarding the
abuses of power evident in Chavez’s and Maduro’s Venezuela, it would now seem
extemporaneous to allow for the cutting of some ethical corners in order to get
to an urgent solution of the Venezuelan tragedy. Such a posture would bring to
mind the strong image of pulling the trash under the rug in order to pretend
that the home has been swept clean.
THIRD
COMMENT
The policy brief lists several of the components
of the strategy for the negotiation.
One reads: “Make space for negotiation. Notwithstanding widespread skepticism in Venezuela regarding dialogue with the Maduro government, at some point a transition usually requires negotiation and compromise between the conflicting parties. This in turn requires conditions that foster discreet conversations, even while public confrontations between the established regime and the opposition proceed full blast’….
One reads: “Make space for negotiation. Notwithstanding widespread skepticism in Venezuela regarding dialogue with the Maduro government, at some point a transition usually requires negotiation and compromise between the conflicting parties. This in turn requires conditions that foster discreet conversations, even while public confrontations between the established regime and the opposition proceed full blast’….
Reading this paragraph I wonder if we are
even speaking the same language. The authors would seem to be advising us, with
the best of intentions, to engage in duplicity: Talk with Maduro discreetly while openly fighting with him. Transparency,
they seem to tell us, would be an enemy of such negotiations.
The authors continue saying: “Don’t
cling to maximalist positions. An authoritarian regime must be confronted,
denounced, and visibly resisted, and citizens must be mobilized in the streets
on occasion to challenge its repressive and arbitrary rule. But the opposition
must not demand or expect too much too soon. It must accept partial and
sometimes unsatisfactory advances in order to open up new possibilities for
leverage”.
This is generally good advice for a
negotiation between two sides that disagree more on the how to do things than
in what to do, but is not necessarily good advice for negotiating with a
corrupt gang such as Maduro’s. Advising the opposition not to cling to maximalist positions sounds ominously like allowing
for excessive concessions. Not to expect
too much too soon sounds like
favoring a delayed game that would favor the permanence of Maduro and his gang
in power. Is this what we want?
FOURTH
COMMENT
The authors say: “Opposition forces must induce
elements within the authoritarian regime to consider a transition. This
requires credibly promising that there will be no wholesale revenge against the
former rulers and their main supporters, and that certain economic and other
interests of established power centers will be respected within the rule of
law. The institutional integrity of the armed forces and police needs to be
assured. The individual rights of former officials must also be protected. It
is not easy to reconcile such assurances with the understandable aspirations of
long-repressed opposition forces, but concrete efforts in this direction have
been necessary in other transitions from authoritarian rule. Vague references
to eventual amnesty and reconciliation, or even broad outline proposals for
legislation, are not enough. Some detailed plans must be made in close
consultation with affected parties. It may be crucial to protect the physical
safety of controversial key leaders. Establish a transitional authority that
includes all sides. Finding means of interim and medium-term power sharing,
rather than insisting up front on specific outcomes or even rules, is crucial
to moving beyond authoritarian rule. For example, accepting General Pinochet as
senator for life and as chief of the armed forces for eight years helped make
Chile’s transition possible. Naming members of the Communist Party as ministers
of defense and the interior facilitated the Polish transition”….”.
Here we are coming closer to the crux of the
matter. The advice we get is to convince members of the regime that they should
go along with a transition by selling them the idea that there will be
guarantees for their wellbeing, that economic “interests” (whatever that means)
will be respected “within the rule of law” (how to recognize the ethical
nuances?). The authors say that key controversial criminal leaders would be
physically “protected” and remind us that Pinochet became a senator in Chile and
members of the Communist party became ministers in the Polish transition. The
advice is for a soft landing, even if it minimizes the importance of some
legitimate moral considerations. Would not this be a moral defeat? Could the
nation live with itself after behaving in such an invertebrate manner? Look at
the countries where these soft landings have taken place. The political
tragedies of Chile still seem to be just below the epidermis and the trash can
be perceived below the rug. When considering the case of South Africa, the
authors of the Brief would find Nadine Gordimer’s posthumous novel quite
illustrative about the social and political crisis in that country.
FIFTH
COMMENT
The authors say: “In the case of Venezuela, some
key officials of the Maduro regime and of the armed forces who want to be part
of Venezuela’s future, key leaders of the democratic opposition, and
representatives of Venezuela’s private sector and its civil society must all be
included in the process of conflict resolution.….. In conflict situations,
political leaders on both sides mobilize support by demonizing their opponents
while claiming the righteousness of their own cause and the inevitability of
triumph. But these mobilization messages can harden positions that make
negotiation much more difficult. It is encouraging that each side sent relative
moderates to begin the discussions brokered by Norway, a good first step. In
order to build viable coalitions…. opposition leaders must find common ground
and sublimate their differences and rivalries. This may require sidelining the
participation of “maximalists”… . This was necessary in Chile, Spain, South
Africa, Brazil, and elsewhere”.
The authors recommend that key officials from
of the regime who “want to be part of Venezuela’s future” must be included in
the process of conflict resolution. This sounds extremely generous. Cabello, El
Aissami, the Rodriguez brother and sister team, the Chavez and the Maduro
families and the Generals who have supported the regime, I am sure they all
would love part of Venezuela’s future. Should they, then, be incorporated to the
solution process? I, for one, would have strong objections to that, on legal,
civic and moral grounds. The authors further recommend that only “moderates”
take part in the negotiations, excluding so-called “maximalists”. What is their
definition of “moderates”? Are they those who stick to principles or those who
close their eyes to the abuses of the regime?
SIXTH
COMMENT
The authors say: “It is vital to work toward
mutual tolerance and acceptance, even if full justice is elusive”.
The authors are to be complimented for their
candor. This message clearly defines the Venezuelan dilemma. Will the Nation
accept a pragmatic solution which would allow it to live as a mélange of good
and evil, a Nation where the honest and the corrupt can coexist peacefully and,
even, share the duties and rights of government? Does crime pays? Are the rules of civilized behavior to be
rewritten? Can Venezuela claim to be a civilized Nation if it allows crime not
only to go unpunished but to share in the management of the future society? Is
peace something to be bought at all costs? Should Venezuela become the land of
the Chamberlains, the Lavals of Latin America? What would be the impact of such
transactions and negotiations on the Venezuela of the future, a country
desiring to have a place among the honest and dignified communities of the
planet?
Surely many of these questions will sound
overly dramatic but I have the conviction that if we are not forceful today in
the defense of ethics and justice we will become permanent slaves of fanatical
and perverse ideologies.
My father used to say that, although olives
come tightly packed in a bottle once you manage to get the first one out the
rest follows easily. I feel this observation also has ethical significance. On
the basis of my experience, he who yields an apparent minor point will probably,
as the first olive of the bottle, go on to yield the major point.
